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To “whiten” the Mountains:
Abolishing Slavery in West(ern) Virginia, 1861−1863
Adam Zucconi
(A note from the editors: Readers will find some of the language in this article
offensive, but the quotations wherein such language appears are historically
accurate and are used to reflect concepts of race and color prevalent in western
Virginia/West Virginia during the Civil War era.)

On June 20, 1863, West Virginia entered the Union as a slave state. In his
inaugural address as the state’s first governor, Republican Arthur Ingraham
Boreman characterized the Mountain State’s creation as a manifestation of
the intrastate sectional tension that had threatened to dismember Virginia
multiple times over the preceding years. Eastern Virginians had “always”
considered the trans-Allegheny an “outside appendage” or “territory,”
Boreman insisted, as constitutional, political, and economic structures
favored eastern Virginians at the expense of their transmontane neighbors.
Empowered by the “original Constitution of the State,” eastern Virginians
had “collected heavy taxes from us” to construct “railroads and canals in the
East” while they “withheld appropriations from the West.” West Virginia’s
“natural channels” meant that “[o]ur markets, our trade[,] and our travel”
occurred with northern and western states, generating “little intercourse”
between eastern and western Virginians. Differences in “nature, our
commerce, travel, habits, associations, and interests” coupled with eastern
Virginians’ support for the “fatal doctrine of secession” strengthened
Boreman’s interpretation that “two peoples” occupied the same state,
making the Old Dominion’s dismemberment inevitable.1
Boreman’s memory of Virginia’s sectional history reflected the
difficulty of leading a state still grappling with the issue of slavery.
While Boreman’s inaugural address suggested that West Virginians chose
the Union over slavery as evidenced by residents’ adoption of a gradual
emancipation clause, conditions on the ground failed to match that lofty
idealism. Northwest Republicans had emerged as vocal supporters of
abolishing slavery to save the Union and to hasten West Virginia’s creation.
“Shall we object that slavery is destroyed . . . if the Union is thereby saved,”
Boreman questioned.2 Republicans, aided by the presence of federal
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troops and their close identification with the
statehood movement, stressed that slavery’s
abolition in western Virginia would liberate
white residents from the political slavery
imposed by eastern slaveholders.3
Republicans’ eagerness to abolish
slavery encountered intense opposition.
Conservative northwesterners—some who
expressed varying degrees of support for
statehood while others outright opposed
it—worried about the broadening scope of
war, notably Republicans’ supposed flagrant
dismissal and denigration of civil liberties
and constitutional guarantees. “[W]aging
. . . a war for the abolishment of slavery in
the southern States is in open violation of
the Constitution,” the Clarksburg Patriot
insisted.4 A war to save the Union had
Arthur Ingraham Boreman
evolved into a war to destroy slavery, a
(source: West Virginia Department
development that unconditional unionists
of Arts, Culture, and History)
before the war had not sanctioned and now
strongly opposed. John S. Carlile maintained this position, arguing that
directions from congressional Republicans to create a free state amounted
to congressional dictation and political submission, not liberation.5
West Virginians’ conflicted thoughts on slavery reflected the messy
divorce of slavery and democratic politics. Since the war’s beginnings,
residents witnessed slavery’s dissolution as slaves escaped their masters
and fled to Union lines or into the non-slaveholding states. These
“contraband” provided witness to the war’s devastating impact on the
institution Confederates wished to preserve; now the war threatened the
viability of slavery. Armed with the daily reminder of slavery’s collapse,
residents wondered how to reconstruct white liberty without black bondage.
Emancipation on the residents’ terms seemed appealing, particularly as
most West Virginians loathed abolitionists and feared their influence in
their new state. Statehood promoters campaigned on the premise that racial
hierarchy would survive without slavery in the new state. An exodus of
slaves and freed blacks following statehood would produce a demographic
“whitening,” supporters declared, preserving the new state for white
residents only. The few remaining freed blacks would labor in menial,
service-oriented positions, a visual manifestation of the racial hierarchy
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West Virginians sought to perpetuate. Restrictive laws, including corporal
punishment, extended antebellum justice on African Americans into the
statehood years. Though slavery would eventually cease to operate, the
institution’s shadow would linger and shape West Virginia.
Statehood and Slavery
The Constitutional Convention convened in Wheeling on November
26, 1861. Critical issues lay ahead for delegates, notably defining the state
boundaries; identifying a name for the new state; and, above all, settling the
issue of slavery.6 In approximately one month, delegates had decided the first
two issues along with approving a new voting method.7 But some delegates
feared that the convention’s progress outpaced residents’ desires. A “body of
radicals and extremists” seized control of the convention, First and Second
Wheeling Convention delegate John J. Davis lamented, and threatened to
“change in toto the character of our State government.” Such men wanted
to “give us a Yankee constitution and laws,” a prospect that “will defeat the
whole movement in West V[irgini]a.” With the question of slavery still left
unsettled, Davis feared that these “radicals and extremists” would institute
changes without first consulting their constituents. Many westerners, Davis
believed, considered government-sanctioned emancipation anathema and
that delegates should avoid such a consideration.8
While the convention settled some debates, the “more difficult question
of slavery is as yet untouched,” Wheeling banker Chester D. Hubbard
observed. And without a resolution on slavery, the “whole movement for
division . . . can not be accomplished at present.” Hubbard identified the
different poles occupied by residents on the issue of slavery. He noted
that some western Virginians “prefer saying nothing about slavery in the
constitution while others are for putting the declaration in” the document.
Proponents of the former, like Waitman T. Willey, argued that members
should “say nothing, [and] do nothing” concerning slavery, ultimately
hopeful that the war would hasten slavery’s demise. Members of the latter,
including Gordon Battelle, were “disposed to give the subject an airing,”
ultimately believing that a frank conversation about slavery would remind
residents about the institutions’ deleterious effects and that the region’s
future development should mirror that of its northern neighbors.9 “We may
say that we are a Southern State, and that we ought to have a negro policy,
just as many foolish people in Western Virginia have said for years past,”
the Wheeling Daily Intelligencer declared, but such pro-slavery thoughts
only “mock, deride, and curse us.”10 Still, few delegates appeared to agree
with Battelle. After conversing with Peter G. Van Winkle, delegate Henry
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Dering cheerfully reported that only
“a handful” supported Battelle’s
position and that delegates “will not
have any trouble in keeping the vexed
question out of the Constitution.”11
Hubbard agreed, suggesting that the
convention should “indicate our future
policy on this question” but offer no
firm declarations concerning slavery’s
future. By late 1861, slavery’s future
in the proposed West Virginia—as in
the nation—remained uncertain.12
The uncertainty surrounding
slavery’s future in the proposed state
reflected tensions across the nation
and in the proposed state. Slavery
provided structure and meaning to
the political acts, privileges, and
Chester Dorman Hubbard (source: West benefits white western Virginians
Virginia Archives & History)
had secured after decades of conflict
and compromise with their eastern
brethren. With slavery and democratic politics inextricably interwoven,
the destruction of the former threatened the latter, a scenario northern
abolitionists and some delegates appeared to disregard. As the Clarksburg
National Telegraph averred, “fanatical abolitionists” like Battelle who
advocated emancipation “cling to the ebony, woolly-headed god of their
idolatry.” Battelle should labor for the “preservation of the liberties of
the twenty millions of white people who are fighting to retain their free
institutions than to be wasting time in endeavoring to liberate the few
thousand slaves of West Virginia.” But if Battelle and his ilk succeeded in
foisting emancipation upon West Virginians, what other legislation would
they enact? Would they seek racial equality at the ballot box?13 Unless freestate advocates could ensure the perpetuation of racial hierarchy without
slavery, West Virginia’s prospects as a free state appeared fleeting.
While white western Virginians debated slavery’s future in the proposed
state, actions undertaken by black western Virginians helped further the
cause of emancipation. Enslaved blacks in western Virginia, like those in
eastern Virginia, the Sea Islands along the South Carolina coast, and other
areas where Union troops presided, had begun self-emancipating. By the
summer of 1861, runaway slaves, or “contrabands,” became commonplace
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across western Virginia. In October 1861, an “old Virginia negro” from Wirt
County accompanied four companies of Union soldiers who had returned to
Wheeling. The escaped slave “belongs to a man now in the rebel army.”14 As
Union Brig. Gen. Benjamin F. Kelley pushed further into the mountains in
late 1861, more slaves took the opportunity to self-emancipate. In Romney,
“[q]uite a large number of contrabands . . . tumbled” into the Union camp
“expecting to be set free,” though the general planned to confine them until
their masters reclaimed them.15 In southern Western Virginia, future president
Rutherford B. Hayes encountered numerous runaway slaves while stationed
as a Union soldier in Fayetteville during the winter of 1861−1862. Hayes
witnessed “a party of contrabands [who] started for Ohio” and remarked
that they will likely “be entitled to freedom, as I understand the rule adopted
by our Government” since their master served in the Confederate army.16
By early 1862, Hayes reported that local secessionists warned slaves that
Union soldiers would “cut off arms of some negroes” and “sell the rest in
Cuba.” Such rumors reflected the instability wrought by the war and the
continued fleeing of slaves from their masters.17
Delegates reconvened in early January 1862 as slaves continued to selfemancipate and the war entered into another year. Gordon Battelle introduced
resolutions on slavery similar to those he had presented in the previous
meeting, including a colonization plan and delaying gradual emancipation
until July 4, 1865. Delegates tabled those
resolutions.18 Henry Dering chastised
Battelle for once again “press[ing] this
subject upon us” and feared that further
agitation on slavery “will prove the
opening of Pandoras Box.”19 Dering
predicted that such resolutions would
“prove . . . fatal before the people” and
would only “produce disturbance[s]”
in West Virginia and other Union slave
states.20 The Wellsburg Herald agreed
with Dering’s conclusion. “The people
will not vote for gradual emancipation
or any other interference with the rights
of slave owners.” Many delegates would
“snap and snarl” if Battelle continued
to persist in his antislavery mission,
jeopardizing the entire statehood Rutherford B. Hayes (source:
Wikimedia Commons restored.jpg)
movement.21
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Battelle persisted despite these fatalistic predictions. On February 12,
he introduced a set of similar resolutions that prohibited African Americans
from entering the state after the constitution’s ratification and paired
this with a more lenient gradual emancipation clause. These resolutions
reflected residents’ desire to demographically “whiten” the state and thus
remove African Americans from it. West Virginia voters, not constitutional
delegates, would either ratify or reject these resolutions.22 Delegates tabled
these resolutions, too, but only by a narrow margin, twenty-four to twentythree.23 The following day, Hancock County minister Joseph Pomeroy
proposed a compromise. West Virginians “do not want free negroes here,”
Pomeroy declared, leading him to recommend the adoption of Battelle’s
prohibition on African Americans entering the state following the
constitution’s ratification. By a forty-eight to one margin, delegates adopted
Battelle’s motion. Following the vote, Marion County delegate Hiram
Raymond instructed Battelle to “never mention slavery here again.”24 The
convention adjourned a few days later after formally adopting a new state
constitution.
Residents’ mixed reactions to the proposed constitution reflected
the divided perspectives on the issue of slavery in the proposed state.
Battelle’s resolution prohibiting the importation of any African Americans,
free or enslaved, amounted to a disappointing defeat for “free soil”
advocates. A Tyler County resident derisively referred to it as “our proslavery Constitution” and doubted that Congress would approve this
constitution.25 The Wellsburg Herald, though, acknowledged the difficulty
in introducing Battelle’s prohibition measure. A “direct emancipation
clause . . . would have shocked long-existing prejudices of a majority of the
people,” the newspaper reasoned. Aggressive advocates of emancipation
“make a great noise, [but] in numbers they don’t amount to much outside
of the Panhandle.” The “people,” it concluded, “are not yet ripe for that
question.”26 Though some Republicans and free-state supporters hoped that
West Virginia’s climate and lack of southern staples would compel African
Americans to move to warmer climates, procreation would likely ensure
slavery’s presence in the new state.27 Many West Virginians “seem to rely
with implicit confidence upon the silent innovations of future years for
[slavery’s] elimination from our midst,” an unnamed resident remarked.
“The voice of history is a disappointment to their cherished hopes.” While
many white residents had insisted for decades that the decreasing slave
population would eventually liberate their region, slavery remained a
central political, social, and economic feature. Why would this time be any
different, residents wondered.28
72

To “whiten” the Mountains: Abolishing Slavery in West(ern) Virginia, 1861–1863

In West Virginia’s First Constitutional Convention, Gordon Battelle twice
introduced resolutions to gradually emancipate slaves. The second time, he was
chastised for his efforts both by other delegates and the media. The West Virginia
Sesquicentennial Highway Historical Marker above recognizes his contributions
to the state (source: West Virginia Archives & History).

73

Adam Zucconi

Other Western Virginia politicians and residents considered Battelle’s
resolution as a compromise that saved the statehood movement. Henry
Dering predicted that had the convention adopted all three of Battelle’s
resolutions, “the whole . . . Sou[th] Western Delegation would have left
. . . and have got their whole people to oppose it.” The new constitution
“would have been voted down by the Counties from Harrison [County] to
the Kentucky line.”29 Taylor County farmer William W. Warder maintained
that delegates constructed “a firstrate constitution” and had “settled the niger
question without any excitement.” He predicted that the compromise “will
be received by all parties with sadisfaction.”30 A Preston County resident
believed that the new constitution would receive the “suffrage of every friend
of a New State, whatever may be his proclivities in regard to the colored
race [emphasis in original].”31 In Wheeling, Chester Hubbard applauded
the “compromise” enacted by the convention, as African Americans would
either “flourish or perish as the case may be.”32 The Wellsburg Herald agreed
with Hubbard’s conclusion. The new constitution would “not interfere with
the master’s rights” but simply allowed slavery to either “stand” or “fall.”33
In short, the approval of Battelle’s resolutions reflected the uncertainty
still surrounding slavery. By not taking a firm position on emancipation,
delegates appeared to implicitly rely upon the war—and contrabands—to
resolve this issue for the proposed state and the nation.
On April 3, West Virginia voters approved the new constitution by a
wide margin, 18,862 in favor to 514 opposed. In some precincts, residents
could also vote on a nonbinding gradual emancipation clause. As with the
proposed constitution, West Virginians overwhelmingly supported gradual
emancipation, 6,052 to 616.34 Residents offered different interpretations
regarding the results of the latter. Free-state supporters believed that this
vote provided “an unmistakable indication that our people want to make
their State a free State.”35 The Wellsburg Herald declared the informal
poll on gradual emancipation “a blow at slavery, and . . . [it] cripples the
rebellion more than the defeat of an army.”36 For some West Virginians, the
vote on the gradual emancipation represented their opportunity to destroy
the institution that had instigated the war and torn the Union asunder. These
residents blamed slaveholders who prized their chattel over white political
equality and for the preceding decades of constitutional battles in the
commonwealth. “The wicked rebellion, as well as all the past and present
injustices suffered by Western Virginia,” Upshur County resident William
M. Shinn declared, “are due to Slavery and the evil principles engendered
by it [emphasis in original].”37 Other residents were more pragmatic. As
a Ritchie County resident argued, the “road by which slave States have
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traveled into the Union, has become so slippery with the blood of the
brave men of our nation that it cannot be traveled any more.” The war had
made slavery unpalatable and West Virginia’s admission as a slave state
impractical. Placing slavery on a path toward gradual extinction would
ensure the state’s admission to the Union.38
Still, others read the results differently, providing insight into how
residents interpreted the intersection of slavery and federalism. John G. Jacob
inferred that residents’ overwhelming approval of gradual emancipation
signaled their desire to control emancipation without congressional
interference and should not be interpreted as abolitionism.39 This opportunity
to control the proposed state’s internal affairs encouraged more men to head
to the polls. As Arthur I. Boreman reported, “[M]any good men in Wheeling,
who generally took no part in politics, were opposed to congress prescribing
the provisions of our constitution on any subject embraced in it.” In short,
fear of “congressional interference” led many residents to support statehood
and gradual emancipation lest northern abolitionists in Congress attempt to
control the process. By voting in favor of the proposed state and gradual
emancipation residents sought to narrow the consequences arising from a
war over slavery.40
The growth of the Republican
Party in the region further
complicated the politics of the
statehood movement and slavery.
Some residents supported gradual
emancipation in an attempt to limit
the power wielded by Republicans,
a group that often appeared
allied with northern abolitionists.
Chester Hubbard reported that
“Republicanism has full sway in the
Panhandle” and that Republicans
“are making every thing bend to
the behest of party.”41 The Wheeling
Daily Intelligencer’s stance on
gradual emancipation in connection
with statehood “has been jesuitical,”
Van Winkle grumbled. Newspaper
editor Archibald Campbell and his
Peter Godwin Van Winkle (source: Prints
and Photographs Division, Library of ilk opposed the “New State unless
Congress)
the Abolitionists can rule,” what Van
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Winkle considered a “humiliating condition.”42 He later prayed that this
Republican “clique will be able to lay the devil [of emancipation] they have
raised.”43 John J. Davis, disgusted with the “Anti-Slavery parasites” in the
state legislature who attempted to foist emancipation on West Virginians,
voted against an antislavery measure.44 He later predicted that the Wheeling
Daily Intelligencer would provide “Comments” on this negative vote and
that the newspaper along with other Republicans would encourage his
constituents to convene “another indignation meeting” against him. With
Republicans seemingly guiding the statehood movement, many residents
feared that these Republicans and their abolitionist allies would mandate
racial and political equality within the state’s borders. By determining how
West Virginians would control and resolve the issue of slavery, Davis and
others believed that they could remove such “parasites” from the body
politic before they infected it with radical ideas.45
For some residents the fear of sickness was tangible and had already
occurred. John Carlile, a one-time supporter of statehood, now emerged
as a vocal opponent and leader of a conservative faction wary of the war
and its expanding effects. And as senator, Carlile possessed a platform for
his views. The senator feared that the war and demands for unquestioned
patriotism provided a “pretext for transcending Constitutional limits,”
notably private property rights. By allegedly assisting runaway slaves, the
Union army acted as an abolitionist agent and was complicit in undermining
the Constitution.46 “The people of the State themselves must be left free
to regulate their own domestic affairs,” the National Telegraph stressed.
The prospect of “Congressional dictation” took on added urgency as the
“negro loving fanatics in Congress” appeared bent on making West Virginia
a free state without “the people determin[ing] the question for themselves
in in their own way [emphasis in original].” That West Virginians were
considering a gradual emancipation clause provided enough evidence
that the entire movement had been tainted by northern abolitionists and
must be immediately halted. As the war continued into its second year
with little prospect of conclusion, some residents feared that the Lincoln
administration and northern abolitionists would become more aggressive
in attacking slavery and trampling upon civil liberties. By controlling the
process of emancipation, West Virginians would avoid such a fate.47
Residents’ aspiration for a new state deepened in mid-1862 as Union
Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign appeared poised to
capture Richmond and end the war before an independent West Virginia had
been secured. Gov. Francis Pierpont, confident that the “rebellion” would be
“shortly put down,” contacted President Lincoln, inquiring about treatment
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of former Confederates and their
political status in the Reorganized
Government of Virginia.48 Other
West Virginians shared this same
expectation in early 1862. “We are
watching and waiting with anxious
hearts for the fall of Richmond,”
Morgantown attorney J. Marshall
Hagans
reported.49
Residents’
anxiousness mingled with their fears
of reuniting with neighbors who
had sided with the Confederacy. If
Richmond fell before West Virginia
became a state, Harrison Hagans of
Preston County explained, the “rebel
constituency in the East will . . . send
John Snyder Carlile (source: West Virginia men to represent them, who will tax
Archives & History)
the West to pay this rebel war debt, and
rule it with an iron rod.” The “pitiless
storm of wrath” that westerners had endured over the preceding decades
would be “made hotter by disappointed ambition in this wicked rebellion.”50
With Confederates unable to create a national “cotton oligarchy,” one
Clarksburg newspaper predicted that these embittered Confederates would
establish a similar “aristocratic structure” in Virginia where the “wealthy”
controlled the government and diminished “the influence of the poor man.”51
McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign likely encouraged many West Virginians
to support the statehood movement, even if it meant slavery’s gradual
abolition. Under this scenario, residents would at least shape the state with
little, if any, northern and abolitionist influence and deliver themselves from
the wrath of their eastern brethren.
The Final Battle for Statehood
By late June 1862, the Senate Committee on Territories released an
amended version of the West Virginia statehood bill.52 This version, authored
by Virginia Senator John Carlile, increased West Virginia by adding fifteen
counties and included a gradual emancipation clause that a new constitutional
convention would have to ratify.53 Carlile’s political chicanery appeared to
doom the statehood movement. “The bill carries death to our new state,”
Henry Dering lamented, as the slave population included in the additional
fifteen counties would rankle northern Republicans. “Our people are in
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despair,” Dering reported, “and
many have now given up all hopes of
a new state.”54 Methodist Episcopal
minister Moses Tichenell of Marion
County likewise bemoaned the
proposed enlargement of the state.
Shenandoah
Valley
residents
possessed “sympathies, habits, and
. . . interests” identical to those
of the “strong niggerdum of the
east” and antagonistic to West
Virginians. Though his neighbors
“are not Abolitionists in the present
acceptation of the offensive term,”
they despised the “rule of [S]outhern
slave[ry]” and sought freedom from
the “tyranical lash of the proud
nabobs of eastern Virginia” at any
Waitman Thomas Wiley (source: Brady- cost, even that of emancipation.55
Handy Photograph Collection, Prints and
Willey, fearful that Carlile’s
Photographs Division, Library of Congress,
changes would derail the entire
photo by Mathew Brady)
statehood
movement,
sought
56
compromise. His “Willey Amendment” would free slaves born after July
4, 1863, while those younger than ten would be liberated upon turning
twenty-one; slaves older than ten but younger than twenty-one would
remain enslaved until they reached twenty-five. The Willey Amendment also
banned importing slaves into the state. Senators approved the compromise
and West Virginia’s admission by a twenty-three to seventeen vote.57 When
the House of Representatives reconvened in December, former opponents
of West Virginia’s admission emerged as supporters because slavery’s
demise in the state appeared certain.58 On December 10, representatives
passed West Virginia’s statehood application, ninety-six to fifty-five. West
Virginia’s statehood bill next required Lincoln’s signature.59
Lincoln felt conflicted on the statehood bill. Issues of slavery,
constitutionality, and timing vexed the president, leading him to solicit
arguments from cabinet members concerning the state’s admission.60
On December 31, 1862, President Lincoln concurred with those cabinet
members who agreed that West Virginia’s admission was “expedient” and
constitutionally sound. West Virginians’ loyalty to the Union and their “aid”
in fighting the rebellion manifested those residents’ devotion to the federal
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government, Lincoln declared. The addition of the Willey Amendment
ensured that “slave soil” would become “free,” what Lincoln considered an
“irrevocable encroachment upon the cause of the rebellion.” The president
applauded West Virginians’ “secession in favor of the constitution” and
granted their request for statehood.61
West Virginia’s admission into the Union would become official
pending ratification of the Willey Amendment by a constitutional convention
and public referendum. For residents sympathetic to the Confederacy,
opposed to “congressional dictation,” or resistant to separation in general,
the referendum provided another opportunity to derail the statehood
movement.62 African Americans, opponents declared, would flood West
Virginia and demand full and equal access to employment opportunities and
the ballot box. To perpetuate and protect racial hierarchy, West Virginians
must reject the Willey Amendment.
Pro-statehood West Virginians launched a counter-offensive, insisting
that ratifying the Willey Amendment would strengthen, not threaten, racial
hierarchy. Gradual emancipation would hasten slavery’s decline in the
region, accelerating a demographic “whitening” already unfolding across
the region. This erosion of slave labor would facilitate the expansion of
“free labor,” transforming West Virginia into an industrial state like Ohio
or Pennsylvania. Removing slaves from the state would also remove West
Virginia outside “Jeff. Davis’ kingdom,” an aristocratic nation allegedly
bent on disenfranchising non-slaveholders.63 Access to the ballot box in
West Virginia, though, would continue for white men regardless of wealth,
while the state’s few African Americans would be disenfranchised. West
Virginians’ abolition of slavery would also hasten the war’s conclusion,
a stinging rebuke to eastern Virginians whose zeal to protect their slave
property now threatened its existence. West Virginians, supporters
proclaimed, would continue to enjoy the benefits of slavery as “whiteness”
would reign as the principal political ethos.
West Virginians in favor of statehood stressed the benefits of “free
soil,” crafting arguments that touched on Virginia’s political and sectional
history. Upon hearing the news that the House of Representatives approved
West Virginia’s admission, an anonymous writer in the Wheeling Daily
Intelligencer celebrated West Virginia’s policy of “equal taxation, [and]
equal representation.” These democratic principles “have animated . . . all
true Western Virginians for many long years.”64 In a meeting in Marshall
County, Brooke County merchant Campbell Tarr, a Wheeling convention
delegate, blamed the “slaveholding oligarchy of Eastern Virginia” for the
“whirlpool of destruction” that now engulfed the country. Tarr expressed
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little remorse for the “poor Eastern Virginia rebel wretches . . . suffering all
the horrors of a desolating and destructive war.” This cabal had governed
the state by the maxim “‘rule or ruin’” over the preceding decades, and
without western allies, eastern Virginians faced certain destruction.65 A
Marion County resident reported that his neighbors “are highly gratified
with the cheering prospect of being separated from Eastern Virginia.” For
decades, western Virginians had lived in “Niggerdom,” where all political
matters centered on slavery. But West Virginia’s establishment and slavery’s
inevitable demise had overthrown the “king” and “master” of this tyrannical
domain.66 Though secessionists “might prate forever about rights, and
might appeal to all our Virginia-ism, and all our nominal connection with
the institutions of the South,” West Virginia was not a southern state, the
Wheeling Daily Intelligencer asserted. Richmond legislators’ attempts to
make the Northwest “[S]outhern” failed because residents shared more in
common with their “free soil” neighbors than eastern Virginians.67
Proponents also maintained that West Virginia’s transformation
into a free state reflected geographical realities. As the Wheeling Daily
Intelligencer explained, “natural causes, silently and uncontrollably at work,
were . . . ridding Western Virginia of slavery,” as the region’s “climate”
and “soil” were hostile to this “foreign institution.” Further, West Virginia’s
proximity to Ohio and Pennsylvania shaped residents’ interpretation of
African-American bondage. The “influence,” “politics,” “industries,” and
“sentiments” of West Virginia’s neighbors “were steadily destroying the
hold of slavery” in the region.68 Abolishing slavery promised to expand
industrial development and place the state on a similar economic trajectory
as that of its neighbors. The “black spots that has given us so much trouble
and retarded our growth and prosperity so greatly” would be removed,
Henry Dering predicted.69 Slavery had “paralyzed” West Virginia’s
economic development over the preceding decades, Willey declared, while
Ohio’s “rapid progress” demonstrated the benefits of “free soil” and “free
labor.” With slavery removed, West Virginians would finally unleash the
state’s “inexhaustible mineral resources” that had remained undisturbed for
decades.70 “Vote in the New State,” he instructed Wheeling laborers, and
“[y]ou will have . . . free labor.”71
The economic prosperity wrought by “free labor” would also protect
white men’s political rights. Confederate leaders sought to establish an
aristocratic government and place white laborers in the same economic
stratum that African-American slaves occupied, statehood supporters
alleged. In a meeting in Triadelphia, Gov. Francis Pierpont declared that
Confederates believe “that the working classes are the mudsills of society”
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and that “capital should own labor.” These beliefs revealed Confederates’
true character. “Aristocracy never could tolerate the idea that the country
should belong to those who rightfully cultivate it,” he proclaimed.72 George
Porter, Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates in Wheeling, agreed.
In a gathering in Wheeling, Porter confirmed that Confederates “are not a
democratic people.” They opposed “a government of all the people” and
sought to restrict the “right of suffrage” until only property owners could
vote.73 In a mass meeting in Philippi, residents maintained that Confederates
sought to create a government “in which negro slavery shall be made a
fundamental principle of government.” Slaveholding would constitute
the “basis of civil preferment, [and] of elevated social positions and
distinctions.” West Virginia’s creation, however, would protect residents
from these antidemocratic Confederates.74
Statehood supporters’ arguments resonated with many residents who
had witnessed political and economic developments unfold over the preceding
decades. The issue of race in a post-slavery state, though, remained divisive.
Abolitionists, opponents maintained, sought to transform West Virginia into
a colony for freed blacks, initiating a demographic “blackening” of the region
and a dismantling of the region’s racial hierarchy. Defying congressional
emancipation by rejecting the Willey Amendment would convince northern
Republicans and their Northwest allies that residents would not submit to
the “Wheeling Abolition clique.”75 This clique, West Virginia conservatives
charged, attempted to foist a constitution crafted by northern abolitionists
and their allies upon residents to maintain “themselves in power and carry
out their promise to the Abolitionists of New England to give the New
State to them [emphasis in original].” The new constitution offered little
benefit for white West Virginians.76 Indeed, a state constitution tinctured by
abolitionism threatened all residents. “No matter where abolition touches,”
the National Telegraph maintained, “it palsies, pollutes and destroys.”77
Opponents hoped to seize upon residents’ widespread hatred for
abolitionism by blurring distinctions between Republicans, abolitionists,
and statehood sympathizers and advocates, a tactic that centered on the
“inevitable nigger question [emphasis in original].”78 Gradual emancipation
would not “whiten” the state but “blacken” the mountains, opponents
insisted, as African Americans would flood the state seeking employment
and political and civic equality. Aided by northern abolitionists and
their West Virginia allies, freed blacks would control the state. Skeptical
residents needed to only look at Lincoln’s draconian policies on confiscating
slaveholders’ property for evidence of abolitionists’ increasing power over
the president and the administration’s prosecution of the war. Abolitionists
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had transformed a war for the Union into a crusade for racial equality, a
transformation that now targeted West Virginia.
John Carlile emerged as a prominent exponent of such views. In a
speech in Clarksburg, Carlile “classed all friends of the New State Bill in the
same category with Wendell Phillips and J. R. Giddings.” These northern
abolitionists wished only to foist racial equality upon West Virginians, even
recruiting residents to carry out this nefarious plan. The “Secessionists of
this vicinity were greatly pleased with the remarks,” reported Union soldier
E .C. Moderwell, while “many undoubted Union men felt outraged by the
same.” Carlile “advised his hearers to resist Congressional interference or
dictation, if needs be with the sword.” In short, white men in West Virginia
had to resist abolitionism.79
President Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation deepened opponents’
convictions that abolitionists demanded slavery’s destruction. Lincoln
“obey[ed] the behests of the insane fanatics he has encouraged around
him,” the National Telegraph alleged, notably those “most ultra men of the
northern faction.” Unionists in Kentucky, Missouri, and Western Virginia,
confronted by the president’s “contemptuous disregard” for their loyalty,
now “must surrender to the fanatics of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
the Western Reserve [emphasis in original].”80 The enlistment of African
Americans incensed residents. West Virginia politicians who supported
such a measure “must think [their] constituents [to be] among the most
narrow, hidebound and contracted of men, if they would support an act,
so objectionable” that the bill’s “grossness” was manifest to everyone.81
Arthur Boreman reported that numerous Union soldiers “are opposed to
the arming and making soldiers of negroes” and predicted that the policy
would “produce disquietude, desertions, and . . . serious demoralization.”82
Still, Republicans persisted in arming African Americans, a policy that
would lead to the “extermination of both races in the slaveholding States.”
These same men, claimed the National Telegraph, also endorsed the Willey
Amendment.83
The 1862 mid-term election results’ buoyed opponents’ hopes that
“Abolition rule is drawing to a close” and that the statehood movement
would be foiled.84 Lincoln’s unconstitutional policies, including his
suspension of habeas corpus and authorization of military trials for
“all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors . . . and all persons
discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any
disloyal practice” revealed the president’s true intentions.85 This blanket
condemnation smacked of executive tyranny and abolitionist meddling.
Lincoln’s “band of demons may be able to construe anything they like into
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disloyalty,” the Charleston Guerilla charged.86 These “arbitrary arrests . . .
were not made for the benefit of the country, but in behalf of the Abolition
party,” the Wheeling Daily Press exclaimed, as the arrests “reduce[d] the
opponents of that party to such an extremity of fear and trepidation that they
would offer no political resistance to its universal domination.” Governor
Pierpont allegedly “hankered” after similar power, “copying upon the
Washington tyrants” to remove “obstacle[s] to his political projects,”
including the creation of West Virginia.87
Pierpont’s quest for unconstitutional executive powers akin to
Lincoln’s demonstrated to statehood opponents that the movement to create
a new state was truly a plot to impose racial equality. Republicans, allied
with abolitionists, promised much with West Virginia’s creation but their
promises rang hollow. “Coming in as the Free Speech, Free Vote, Free Soil
and Free man’s party,” Republicans offered “flimsy fictions about what great
things are com[ing] to the New State,” the Wheeling Daily Press claimed.88
Republicans’ “sole aim,” “every act,” and “highest ambition . . . irrespective
of their own race or their government,” the Morgantown Monitor protested,
“is for the negro.” Republicans’ “speeches are for the negro; their votes are
for the negro; [and] their taxes are for the negro[emphasis in original].”
Despite the “wild and reckless theories” expounded by “Abolitionists,
fanatics, and many leaders of the Republican party,” the Monitor’s editor
reminded his audience that African Americans constituted an “inferior race,
deficient in judgment, and incapable of self-government.” This “inferior
race” would clamor for political and social equality with West Virginia’s
founding; would residents sanction such actions?89
Triadelphia residents pledged resistance to such efforts. “We look
upon the effort to place the African upon an equality with the white man
in Western Virginia as vain and foolish,” residents declared during a
mass meeting. Previous attempts of imposing racial equality had failed,
“bring[ing] demoralization and ruin to both” races and had threatened to
“destroy the best interests of our country.” Welcoming “free negroes into
Western Virginia,” residents further averred, was “unwise and ruinous to
the order and good morals of our society.” These West Virginians promised
resistance to abolitionists’ efforts.90
West Virginians’ opposition to the “black toadies” that advocated
statehood reflected their concern that a new state would overturn the region’s
established racial hierarchy.91 A “majority” of residents opposed the “negroequalizing amendment” known as the Willey Amendment, one conservative
newspaper declared, but military and political authorities at the behest
of abolitionists prevented a full and open discussion of the issue.92 West
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Virginians are to be “enslaved, and . . . Africanized” if voters ratified the
Willey Amendment, the Clarksburg Patriot warned.93 Wheeling abolitionists
“would not pass the New State bill without imposing the condition that
it should be an Abolition State, and a roosting and lurking place for the
negroes [emphasis in original].”94 Statehood supporters hoped to transform
West Virginia into “a colony for runaway negroes,” welcoming African
Americans with the promise of liberation by the Willey Amendment.95
The National Telegraph suggested renaming the amendment “An act to
Africanize North Western Virginia, and to enslave the white inhabitants
thereof” to more accurately represent the amendment’s purpose.96 “Give
us a new State, un-Abolitionized,” the Wheeling Daily Press demanded,
“a new State without the secret machinery which is to guide its control
and direction into Abolition.”97 Protecting West Virginians’ racial hierarchy
demanded that residents oppose this abolitionist attempt to impose gradual
emancipation upon unwilling residents, even if this opposition undermined
the statehood movement. As the Clarksburg Patriot proclaimed, “[E]very
man who is opposed to making Western Virginia a free negro colony” must
reject the new state.98
Statehood proponents, though, maintained that West Virginia’s
creation guaranteed and protected “whiteness,” even without slavery. West
Virginia’s admission into the Union ensured that, regardless of the war’s
outcome, Deep South planters would not politically enslave white residents
or consider them “like slaves on the block.”99 The Willey Amendment would
compel slaveholders to sell or emancipate their chattel, while the prohibition
on importing slaves would further “whiten” the Mountain State. And with
a climate inhospitable for freed blacks or plantation agriculture, African
Americans had little incentive to remain in the state. The demographic
“whitening” that would unfold across West Virginia promised a thorough
“whitening” of the political process, too.
West Virginia’s demographic “whitening” had been unfolding for
years, statehood proponents declared, as census data revealed a decline in
the slave population. “The end of slavery is a foregone conclusion,” the
Wellsburg Herald insisted.100 In the northern panhandle, both slavery and
“free negroes” have been “dead letters,” and John G. Jacob believed that
the “entire free black population can be counted on the fingers.”101 Waitman
Willey agreed with Jacob’s reasoning. Willey, a slaveholder, considered the
number of African-American slaves in West Virginia “too small to stand in
the way of the public good.” Further, the state’s “geographical situation”
meant “that slavery could never exist here to any great extent, even if it were
desirable to have it.” Willey and other statehood proponents ignored the
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region’s long history with slavery and the slave trade, insisting instead that
few residents desired slaves and fewer free blacks. By supporting statehood,
residents would rid themselves of both groups.102
Emancipating African-American slaves raised the question of freed
blacks’ status in the new state. West Virginians held a “deep and universal
prejudice against this class of persons,” confessed one statehood proponent.103
Waitman Willey acknowledged that adversaries “clamor[ed] about the
danger of free-negro-ism,” but he and other advocates believed that African
Americans would not constitute a problem in West Virginia.104 A “very large
proportion of the slaves will be converted into money and started Southward,”
the Wellsburg Herald declared.105 “[O]ur Northern negrophobists” further
reasoned that “free negroes will remain where they were born and continue
to work for their masters,” especially those on Southern plantations. The
Herald predicted that the Emancipation Proclamation would accelerate the
“current of negro travel . . . southward,” draining the African-American
population and whitening the Upper South.106
But would the few African Americans who remained increase
competition in the job market and depress wages? Statehood opponents
maintained that West Virginia’s founding would trigger a flood of freed
blacks, where “every nigger” would push “a white man out of employment,”
and local German immigrants “would all be turned out of employment and
free negroes substitute[d] in their stead.”107 Statehood promoters dismissed
this baseless rumor. African Americans “will seek menial employment as
they always and everywhere do,” one supported declared.108 “The hotel,
the barber shop, [and] the steamboat, are the paradise of the free negroes,”
answered another proponent, as blacks would labor as “waiters, porters,
barbers or hostlers” while avoiding any “mechanical employment.” These
service occupations reinforced racial hierarchy, as African Americans would
labor in subordinate service industries while white residents occupied more
prestigious positions. This unnamed author assured West Virginians that
African Americans “naturally adapt themselves” to those “peculiar services,”
calming fears that freed blacks would seek to challenge that labor hierarchy.109
African Americans’ subordinate position reflected the will of
Providence, a universal truth that statehood supporters endorsed. “How
can the negro, whom God has made so inferior to the white, morally,
intellectually and physically, ever be made his equal[?]”110 West Virginians
received confirmation of such beliefs from minstrel shows, a popular
cultural performance that allowed audience members to express their racial
anxieties and collective fears of African Americans.111 Minstrels’ mockery
of African Americans reinforced statehood advocates’ assertions that the
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“ignorant African slave” and his “offspring” were unsuited to the labor
required in West Virginia’s economy. White laborers in West Virginia, not
African Americans, would provide the labor needed to unleash the new
state’s mineral resources.112
The menial employment African Americans occupied reflected
their political status in the new state, too. “The hackneyed song of negro
equality, negro jurors, and the like, is the old argument of secessionists,” a
resident grumbled.113 This “old argument” was impossible in West Virginia,
supporters explained, because the new state “will have the strongest anti-free
negro laws of any loyal State in the Union.” West Virginia would enforce
the “old laws of Virginia,” laws characterized as “severe and restrictive
enough to meet the fears of the most timorous.”114 Article 11, Section 8 of
West Virginia’s proposed constitution stated that the “common law and the
laws of the State of Virginia” concerning free African Americans would
remain untouched. These laws included forced removal of freed blacks
older than twenty-one, imprisoning individuals who transported blacks into
the state, and imposing fines on African Americans who refused to leave the
state. Corporal punishment against this last group would also be enforced.
Slavery’s shadow would still linger over the mountains even though the
institution would soon no longer officially exist.115
Slavery’s demise not only benefited West Virginia but the entire
nation, as the institution’s death in the Mountain State would hasten the
war’s conclusion. “This is a Pro-Slavery Rebellion,” the Fairmont National
declared, “fomented by slaveholders, and for Slavery’s sake.” West
Virginia’s admission would assist in slavery’s “overthrow and extinction.”116
Many statehood advocates endorsed Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation
as a similar means of destroying the Confederacy and ending the war. The
Wellsburg Herald believed that the proclamation would “speedily bring the
war to an issue.”117 In a new state mass meeting in Ohio County, residents
“hail[ed] the President’s emancipation proclamation as an efficient means
of destroying the prime cause and backbone of the present malignant and
unholy rebellion.”118 Ending the war would hopefully end the guerilla
conflict that had terrorized residents, too. Arthur Boreman reported that
counties below the northern panhandle were “not safe for a loyal man”
and recommended that loyalists remain within “sight of the Ohio River
[emphasis in original].”119 Virginia Rep. Jacob B. Blair of Parkersburg
instructed Willey to hold “the election [on the new constitution] as early as
possible before warm weather when the guerrillas can infest the mountains
and prevent the people from voting.” With the state’s future assured, such
attacks would hopefully cease.120
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The constitutional convention
that reconvened in February 1863
enacted few substantive changes to
the constitution ratified by voters
the previous year. Compensating
loyal slaveholders emerged as the
most divisive issue, with James
Brown of Kanawha demanding
federal compensation for loyal
slaveholders who immediately
emancipated their slaves and
James S. Wheat of Morgan County
suggesting that funds derived from
the sale of Confederate property,
including slaves, be directed to loyal
Jacob Beeson Blair (source: Wikipedia)
slaveholders.121 Both proposals
failed.122 Rather, in a unanimous
vote, delegates approved the Willey Amendment fifty-four to zero, while
agreeing to petition the federal government for two million dollars for
loyal slaveholders.123 West Virginia voters would ratify or reject the new
constitution on March 26, the final obstacle to statehood.
On that date, West Virginia residents and soldiers voted overwhelmingly
to ratify the new state constitution with the Willey Amendment, 28,318 in
favor to 572 opposed.124 Upon receiving the returns, on April 20, President
Lincoln issued a proclamation that West Virginians had satisfied all
constitutional obligations and West Virginia would be admitted into the
Union on June 20, 1863.125 The Wheeling Daily Intelligencer celebrated
the “wonderful” results, regarding the wide margin as a “grand and
overwhelming . . . triumph.”126 West Virginians’ demonstrated that they
“didn’t need a new nigger State” but a “free State,” even though “such men
as Carlile . . . were for the niggers” and attempted to sway voters to that
perspective, too.127 The creation of West Virginia—and the destruction of
slavery—via the ballot box appeared inevitable as residents celebrated the
election results.
“Whitening” the New State at the Expense of Blacks
Slavery’s death via democracy, however, may have been somewhat
premature and myopic. West Virginians’ initial policy on slavery only
prohibited the importation of African American slaves, a resolution that
signaled residents’ reluctance to dismantle the institution. Congressional
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pressure compelled West Virginians to pursue compromise, but the accord
reached by politicians and ratified by voters reflected residents’ continued
endorsement of proslavery beliefs and democratic principles. From a
practical standpoint, slavery would continue to operate in the new state for
decades. The Willey Amendment delayed emancipation for thousands of
young slaves while older slaves would remain in bondage until death. African
Americans could acquire freedom through self-emancipation or through
manumission, but some slaveholders, wary of losing their investment,
could look for prospective buyers in nearby Kentucky or Missouri. AfricanAmerican bondage in West Virginia would likely continue into the twentieth
century, when a majority of statehood leaders would have passed on and
entrusted their descendants to tackle the final stages of emancipation. Could
shifting political and racial norms reignite this emancipation debate? How
would an independent and permanent Confederate nation shape this debate?
With no prospective conclusion to the Civil War by 1863, slavery’s future
remained uncertain but few predicted the institution’s demise in only a few
years. Still, regardless of the Civil War’s outcome, the “politics of slavery”
would figure prominently over the coming decades, cementing slavery’s
centrality to politics.
Slavery’s influence was manifest in the new constitution. While
emancipation unfolded over the proceeding decades, laws imposed on
African Americans promoted and perpetuated racial hierarchy. Corporal
punishment remained on the books, authorizing white authorities to mete
out punishment on unrepentant blacks. Freed blacks would perform menial
labor, occupying low-level service positions while white laborers occupied
more prestigious and lucrative positions. African Americans would not
“blacken” West Virginia’s growing industrial sector. This economic
segregation carried over into politics. Statehood leaders’ refusal to endorse
African-American political and civil rights or countenance any status for
blacks other than slavery reflected their desire to “whiten” the Mountain
State. Disenfranchised and marginalized freed blacks provided similar visual
evidence as enslaved African Americans before the war: politics remained
the purview of white men. West Virginians’ embrace of democratic reform
with a new state exhibited neither a clean break from slavery nor their
Virginia heritage that historians suggest.
Rather, the political “whitening” residents sought with statehood
reflected a continuation of antebellum norms concerning race and politics,
norms constructed and refined through residents’ defense of AfricanAmerican bondage and political equality for white men.
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